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1 .  Introduction 
On Polar Questions 
Robert van Rooy and Marie Safar-ova 
ILLC, University of Amsterdam 
According to the popular HamblinlGroenendijk & Stokhof (Hamblin 1973,  Groe­
nendijk & Stokhof 1984) semantic theories of questions, the meaning of a question 
Q is a set of propositions that are "good" answers to the question. Thus the meaning 
of the question Is Luke right? is a set containing the proposition Luke is right and 
its complement, Luke is not right. The same holds for the negative polar question 
Is Luke not right? 
( 1 )  [ [Is Luke right?] ] = [ [Is Luke not right?] ]=  
{Aw[Luke i s  right in  w] , Aw[Luke i s  not right in  w J }  
The meanings of alternative questions (alQs) like Is Luke right or is Mark right? can 
be seen as special cases of wh-questions .  For example, in Hamblin's system (with 
von Stechow's extension regarding the meaning of the disjunctive connective) it is 
the union of two sets of propositions :  those containing the proposition that Luke is 
right and those containing the proposition Mark is right. 
(2) [ [Is Luke right or is Mark right?] ] = [ [Luke is right] ] U [ [Mark is right] ] = 
{Aw[Luke is right in wJ } U {Aw[Mark is right in wJ } = 
{Aw[Luke is right in w] , Aw[Mark is right in wJ } 
Consequently, the semantics of an alternative question composed of two polar al­
ternatives , like Is Luke right or is Luke not right? is the same as the semantics of 
the polar question in ( 1 ) .  
(3) [ [Is Luke right or is Luke not right?] ]=  
{ Aw[Luke is right in w] , A w[Luke i s  not right in w] } 
According to Hamblin's theory, there is thus no difference between positive po­
lar questions (PPQs), negative polar questions (NPQs) , and alternative questions 
(composed of two polar alternatives) in terms of their meaning. Groenendijk & 
Stokhof ( 1984) - making use of type-shift - basically predict the same. There is 
evidence, however, that the three types of questions are not always interchangeable. 
In the next section, we will give examples of contexts where the different polar 
questions and the alternative questions either cannot occur in free variation at all, 
or they receive different readings .  In section 3 of this paper, we will summarize 
possible semantic and pragmatic approaches to the data and point out why they are 
not satisfactory. In section 4 and 5,  we will offer a decision-theoretic account and 
show in detail how it can solve the previously discussed puzzles. The final section 
summarizes the proposa1. 
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ON POLAR QUESTIONS 
2. Differences between Positive, Negative, and Alternative Questions 
2. 1 .  Positive versus Negative Polar Questions 
Although the positive and negative polar question Is Luke right? and Is Luke not 
right? are alike in that both the yes and the no answer are the (only) complete 
answers to both questions, they cannot always be used interchangeably without 
change of meaning. Quite convincing examples are rhetorical questions, or tag 
questions like (4) : 
(4) a. John is nice, isn't he? 
b. John isn't such a bad guy, is he? 
The tag question (4a) is used if the speaker wants to indicate that John is nice, while 
in (4b) she wants to indicate that he isn't a bad guy. 
The implicature associated with the negative tag question in (4a) might sug­
gest that a negative polar question always indicates that the speaker takes the posi­
tive proposition to be more likely. As it turns out, however, negative polar questions 
can also be used if the speaker expects a negative answer. Consider Ladd's ( 1981 )  
original example where the  relevant polar question i s  highlighted. In  this case, 
Kathleen uses the negative polar question and expects a positive answer. 
(5) Situation: Kathleen and Jeff have just come from Chicago on the 
Greyhound bus to visit Bob in Ithaca. 
a. Bob :  You guys must be starving. You want to get something to eat? 
b. Kathleen: Yeah, isn't there a vegetarian restaurant around here? 
- Moosewood, or something like that? 
c. Bob :  Gee, you've heard about Moosewood all the way out in 
Chicago huh? OK, let's go there. 
In the following example, however, she rather expects the negative answer. 
(6) Situation: Bob is visiting Katleen and Jeff in Chicago while 
attending the CLS. 
a. Bob :  I 'd like to take you guys out to dinner while I ' m  here - we'd 
- have time to go somewhere around here before the evening 
session tonight, don't you think? 
b. Kathleen: I guess,  but there's not really any place to go to 
in Hyde Park. 
c. Bob:  Oh, really, isn't there a vegetarian restaurant around 
here? 
d. Kathleen: No, about all we can get is hamburgers and souvlaki. 
Ladd (198 1 )  argues that to account for this distinction, we have to assume a genuine 
syntactic/semantic ambiguity here, involving a difference in scope of the negation. 
We will come back to these examples and see in how far we have to assume that the 
difference between (5b) and (6c) involves a different use of negation. 
293 
294 Robert van Rooy and Marie Safar-ova 
Another type of contexts in which negative polar questions are not quite 
interchangeable with positive polar questions are those where knowledge that the 
negative proposition is true gets the speaker closer to her conversation goal. One 
example is that of a medical examination, as observed on hospital fliers :Is your 
child apathetic ? Is your child not eating properly ? Has (s)he not been sleeping 
for the last three days ? Similarly, one can test the ecological behavior of fellow 
citizens by asking them Do you turn off appliances when they are not in use ? Do 
you not dump waste ? Do you not run the water while brushing your teeth ? 
2 .2 .  Alternative versus Polar Questions 
Bolinger ( 1978) noted that polar questions and alternative questions cannot always 
be considered variants of each other. ] Based on Bolinger's observations and our 
own collection of data, we grouped contexts in which this is the case into the fol­
lowing categories : 
1 .  Requests 
While polar questions are common as pleas or requests , it seems strange to 
use an alternative question in the same context. Compare (7a) to (7b) , or 
(8a) to (8b) . 
(7) a. Will you marry me? 
b. Will you marry me or not? 
(8) (train conductor to a passenger) 
a. May I see your ticket? 
b. May I see your ticket or not? 
2. Drawing Inferences 
When drawing inferences , either linguistic (as in (9)) , or situational (as in 
( 10), when somebody just came into the room with her jacket soaking wet) , 
polar questions appear to be more appropriate than alternative questions . 
(9) a. A: I just saw David. 
B :  Is David back from Toronto? 
b. B :  Is David back from Toronto or not? 
( 10) a. Is it raining? 
b. Is it raining or not? 
3 .  Invitations 
Invitations are often impolite (or impossible, as in the elided ( 12b)) if uttered 
as alternative questions . In some situations , though, it may be preferable to 
use an alternative question like ( l Ib) rather than the polar one in ( l l a) ,  e .g . ,  
if the speaker does not want to come across as being pushy. 
ON POLAR QUESTIONS 
( 1 1 ) a. Do you want something to drink? 
b. Do you want something to drink or not? 
( 12) a. Cigarette? 
b. Cigarette or not? 
4. Conversation Starters 
If the goal of conversation participants is mainly to communicate friendly 
intentions towards each other and to engage in a polite exchange for a certain 
period of time, the use of the polar question in ( 13a) is more likely than the 
alternative question in (1 3b) . 
( 13) a. Do you like to play golf? 
b. Do you like to play golf or not? 
5 .  Rhetorical Questions 
It seems impossible to realize rhetorical questions like ( 14) as alternative 
questions . Although with rhetorical questions , an answer is not expected, 
we assume that their use is parasitical on the proper use of questions and the 
contrast between ( 14a) and (14b) should thus be accounted for. 
( 14) a. Are you crazy? 
b. Are you crazy or not? 
It seems that at least with one type of negative polar questions, alternative question 
variants are not possible. Thus (15b) is not a paraphrase of ( 15a) ;  it is actually dif­
ficult to think of a context in which it could be used (though ( 15c) is acceptable, so 
this may simply be due to a convention on the order of alternatives in the question). 
( 15) a. Don't you have to ask your parents first? 
b. Don't you have to ask your parents first or do you? 
c. Do you have to ask your parents first or don't you? 
3. Towards a pragmatic account 
Why can't positive polar questions, negative polar questions, and alternative ques­
tions always be considered variants of each other? The first possible explanation is 
that this is due to the fact that these questions have a different semantics. Thus, con­
trary to what is standardly assumed, one might say that ( 1 )  and (3) do not have the 
same denotation. Perhaps the most obvious way to account for this would be to say 
that the positive and negative PQ in ( 1 )  just denote the singleton set containing the 
proposition that Luke is right, {q}, and that he is not right, { -,q}, respectively, while 
(3) denotes the set that contains both, {q ,  -,q} . In fact, extending Hamblin's ( 1973) 
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semantics for wh-questions to yes/no-questions immediately gives rise to this effect. 
According to Hamblin's semantics the meaning of a wh-question like Who came ? 
is the following set of propositions : {Aw [d came in w] : d E  D} . When we extend 
this analysis to n-ary wh-questions, the following results (where 5! (d) is an n-ary 
sequence of variables (individuals)) : 
[ [?5!Pil] 
Let us call this denotation the extended Hamblin denotation. Polar questions result 
when n = 0, and the predicted denotation of ? q then is {q} . 
Both Hamblin and Groenendijk & Stokhof assume that the meaning of a 
yes-no question is its set of complete answers . On this reading, the above sugges­
tion by itself is not enough to account for our data - it seems necessary to 'rein­
terpret' the question-meaning. As a matter of fact, Roberts ( 1996) makes use of 
the above discussed extended Hamblin denotation of questions and proposes that 
polar questions give rise to the denotation as suggested above. However, she does 
not consider the elements of a question-denotation to be the possible answers to 
the question, but rather the propositions in the truth value of which the questioner 
is interested. Although this interpretation is appealing, the proposal is not enough 
to solve our problem: assuming a two-valued semantics, if somebody is interested 
in learning if q is the case, she should be equally interested in learning if --.q is 
the case. The proposal thus does not make a distinction between the positive and 
negative proposition that can account for the difference between PPQs,  NPQs,  and 
AlQs. 
The above discussion suggests that to make a distinction between the pos­
itive and the negative proposition, we should look beyond the semantic factors , 
namely to pragmatics. A possible pragmatic way to make the needed distinction 
was suggested by H. Zeevat (p.c .) who proposed a solution in terms of 'weak pre­
supposition' .  A weak presupposition is weaker than a real presupposition in that 
it can be triggered by embedded clauses (as in ( 16) for the particle too) , or by a 
linguistic or a behavioral suggestion in the context. 
( 1 6) A: John dreamt that Mary was in Spain. 
B :  Harry is in Spain, too. 
Weak presupposition is a kind of minimal evidence in the common ground. This 
allows for a context to contain a weak presupposition both for a positive proposition, 
as well as for its negation. The difference between different types of questions 
would then be captured by differences in the weak presuppositions as follows :  
ON POLAR QUESTIONS 
TYPE OF QUESTION ABB REVIATION CONTEXT 
Positive polar question ?q no weak 
presupposition 
or 
weak presupposition 
for q 
Negative polar question ?-,q weak presupposition 
for -,q 
Alternative question ?q or -'q weak 
presupposition for q 
and -,q 
As a matter of fact, Biiring and Gunlogson (2000) offer somewhat comparable in­
tuitions in terms of their 'Evidence Conditions ' :  
• PPQ: there is no compelling evidence against q 
• ONPQ: there is no compelling evidence for q 
• INPQ: there is compelling evidence against q 
where q is the proposition expressed by the question, ONPQ stands for Ladd's 
'outer-negation polar question' and INPQ for ' inner-negation polar question' .  (We 
will return to this distinction below.) 
One argument against the weak-presupposition analysis is based on the fact 
that a negative polar question like ?-,q can be used in contexts which contain no evi­
dence for either q or -'q. For example, when browsing the internet, a user may come 
across web sites asking Do you not have any friends ? Then click on this button . . .  
or Have you not been able to receive credit from your financial institution to back 
up your business activities ? Then. . . . Given that the creators of the web sites have 
no prior information about the user's private life or financial situation, they could 
not possibly pose their questions based on prior evidence. Rather, they use negative 
polar questions instead of the positive ones because it is the truth of the negative 
proposition that is relevant for the user's intended next step (click on a button) . 
Another example of an unbiased context is that of medical examination, 
already mentioned above. The choice of questions (positive or negative) is deter­
mined by the list of symptoms for a given illness. The doctor would most likely not 
ask Has she not been apathetic ? or Is she smiling or playful?, because if it were so, 
it would not help her to reach a diagnosis . The goal of the doctor-patient discourse 
is not to determine how well we perform in certain areas , but where our perfor­
mance is below average. In other words, it seems that whether the speaker opts for 
a negative or for a positive polar question at least partly depends on her conversa­
tion goals . This point is not accounted for by either of the approaches summarized 
above. 
Another relevant example is that of a context biased with respect to a propo­
sition in which an alternative question can be posed. Thus in ( 1 7) ,  B can easily 
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respond with an alternative question to A's utterance if she thinks that A is in a po­
sition to answer the question reliably, even though there is a weak presupposition 
in the context for Bill killed the neighbor 's dog. Similarly, in ( 1 8) ,  the speaker can 
use both a positive polar question or an alternative question in a context biased for 
a proposition (if we assume that bias can also be generated by inferences) .  
( 17) a. A:  John thinks that Bill killed the neighbor 's dog. 
b. B :  Well, did he kill it or not? 
( 1 8) The political situation in the country is unstable. 
Is it safe to go there or not? 
Finally, there is the 'paradox of positive polar questions ' :  it seems that this type 
of questions can be used not just in contexts containing positive evidence, but also 
in contexts with negative evidence. This is in case that a new surprising fact has 
come up which the speaker is for some reason reluctant to ground, as in ( 19a) and 
(20a) , or, even more strongly, in ( 19b) and (20b) with contrastive accents, because 
she believes the negative proposition to be more likely. 
( 19) a. Are you telling me to leave? 
b. Are YOU telling ME to leave? 
(You are not in a position to give me orders .) 
(20) a. Is John the boss? 
b. Is JOHN the boss? 
(I thought Peter was the boss .) 
These examples show that the data are more problematic than it would seem at the 
first blush. We agree with Zeevat that the distinction between the two sorts of ques­
tions should be explained in pragmatic terms; moreover, the examples which served 
to doubt the weak: presupposition theory as the general account, also showed that 
two further factors influence the choice of polar questions over alternative questions 
(or vice versa) : the likelihood of some proposition being true (as in ( 19) and (20)) 
and the goals of the speaker/writer-hearer/reader interaction (as in the doctor-patient 
dialogue) . In the next section, we will propose a decision-theoretic description of 
the question types which incorporates these two features. In general, we will ar­
gue that the difference between the various types of polar questions and alternative 
questions can be captured in terms of the expected utilities of their answers. In 
this way we don't  have to assume that the different types of questions give rise to 
different denotations . 
4. The utility of answers 
In the semantic/pragmatic analysis of natural language we often take the beliefs 
of the conversational participants into account. In speech act theory it has always 
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been assumed that this is not enough� we should consider their preferences (or 
desires) as well. Once both beliefs and preferences are taken into account, it be­
comes natural to make use of decision theory. The decision-theoretic approach to 
semantics and pragmatics of natural language has been advocated in recent studies 
(e.g . ,  Merin ( 1999) and van Rooy (to appear a, b)) to account for, among others, 
conversational implicatures and the interpretation of questions .  In decision theory, 
an agent's belief-desire state is modelled as a tuple (P, U) , where P stands for 
the agent's probability function, which represents her beliefs , and U for her utility 
function, which together with P models her preferences . Here we will make use of 
Jeffrey's ( 1965) decision theory, where utility functions are functions from worlds 
to real numbers. In this framework, we can determine the expected utility of any 
proposition p as below. 
EU(p) = L pew) x U(w) 
wEp 
In particular, we can determine the utility of the tautologous proposition, T. This is 
important, because the expected utility of proposition T measures the value of the 
current belief-desire state: EU(T) = LWET pew) X U(w) = Lw pew) x U(w) . 
From now on we will denote this value by EU(P, U) . If (P, U)  and (P' ,  U') are 
two different belief-desire states, EU(P, U) > EU(P' ,  U') means that the agent 
prefers to have the beliefs and desires as represented in (P, U) to the beliefs and 
desires in (P' ,  U') . As we will see below, this value of a belief-desire state will be 
of crucial importance to determine the utility of new information. 
The above noted representation of a belief-desire state is very general� in 
particular, what the utility function depends on is left open. For our present pur­
poses, we will consider only some specific instantiations .  First, let us assume that 
our agent has a certain goal or desire : the desire to be in a world where 9 is true, or 
the goal to make that world actual where 9 is true. In that case we can assume that 
the utility function is defined as follows: 
U(w) = 1 iff w E  g ,  0 otherwise 
Notice that now the value EU(P, U) reduces to the probability of g, P(g) .2 
As a second special case, let us assume that our agent just wants to know 
what the world is like. In that case it is natural to assume that the utility of the 
worlds crucially depends on the probability function that represents the beliefs of 
the agent. If the agent's beliefs are represented by probability function P, the utility 
of the world w turns out to be logP(w) (cf. van Rooy (to appear b)) . If we now 
calculate the value of the state (P, U) , it turns out that this will equal the negative 
entropy on the set of all worlds induced by probability function P. To show this, we 
first have to know how to determine the entropy of a partition. Suppose that Q is a 
set of propositions that partitions the state space. The entropy of Q with respect to 
P, Ep(Q) , is then determined as follows : Ep(Q) = - LqEQ P(q) x logP(q) (cf. 
Shannon ( 1 948)) . This value measures the uncertainty about which element of Q 
is true: Ep (Q) is maximal in case all elements of Q are equally likely, and Ep(Q) 
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is 0 - which is the minimal entropy value a partition can receive - if the agent 
knows for certain which element of Q is the case. If we assume that W denotes the 
partition corresponding to the set of all worlds , the entropy of W with respect to 
probability function P, Ep(W) , is determined as - Lw P(w) x logP(w) . Because 
by assumption EU (P, U) = Lw P(w) x logP(w) , this means that EU(P, U) = 
-Ep (W) . And this makes sense as well : the entropy of partition Q measures to 
what extent the elements of Q are equally likely. If an agent wants to know what 
the world is like, she would prefer to have a probability function that gives rise to 
a low entropy of partition W. And this is what we predict: because EU(P, U) = 
-Ep (W) ,  this value is high if and only if Ep(W) is low. 
Until now we have only determined the value of the current belief-desire 
state of an agent. Now we are going to use this to determine how good it is to learn 
the new information that proposition q is the case. As is standard in decision theory, 
we will measure the value of this new information in terms of the difference between 
the values of the information states before and after the agent learned proposition q. 
We will assume that learning proposition q goes by conditionalization: we eliminate 
all worlds where q is not true and the probabilities among the resulting worlds are 
distributed as similar as possible as in the prior probability function. We will denote 
the probability function after conditionalizing P with q by Pq, and thus assume that 
Pq (w) = P(w/q) . We will measure the value of new information q, UV(q) , as 
follows : 
UV(q) EU(Pq ,  U) - EU(P, U) 
What will this utility value come down to in the particular cases we considered 
above? 
First, consider the case where the utility function only depends on the goal 
proposition g. We saw that in this case EU(P, U) reduces to P(g) . From this it 
immediately follows that the value of new information q reduces to the difference 
between P(g/q) and P(g) , i .e .  UV(q) = P(g/qJ - P(g) . 
Next, we will consider the situation where our agent just wants to know 
which world is the actual one. We saw that now the value of a state, EU(P, U) , re­
duces to the negative entropy of the partition W, -Ep (W) .  It immediately follows 
that the utility value of the new information q reduces to the difference between 
-EPq ( W) and -Ep (W) , i .e .  UV(q) = -EPq (W) - -Ep(W) .  This is obviously 
the same as the reduction of entropy of W due to learning q, Ep (W) - EPq (W) . 
In natural circumstances, this ,  in tum, reduces to the surprisal value of q, inf(q) 
= -log P( q) , a measure well-known in Information Theory (Shannon ( 1 948)). This 
surprisal value is defined such that for any two propositions q and q' , inf( q) > inf( q') 
if and only if P(q) < P(q') .  
How i s  this rather technical discussion relevant for our analysis of polar 
questions? Notice first that in case our agent has a goal 9 to be(come) true, it 
holds that UV(q) > UV(-,q) if and only if P(g/q) > P(g/-,q) if and only if 
P(g / q) > � (the probability of reaching her goal after finding out that q is higher 
than after finding out that -'q, i .e . ,  higher than �) .  Second, in case she wants to know 
what the world is like it holds that UV(q) > UV( -,q) if and only if P(q) < P(-,q) . 
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In the rest of this paper we will make use of these simple facts to account for our 
observations discussed above. 
5. Analysis 
Although from a logical point of view there is no essential difference between 'pos­
itive' and 'negative' propositions, there exists a remarkable contrast between posi­
tive and negative assertions. As discussed in great detail by Giv6n ( 1978) ,  negative 
assertions are much more marked than positive ones. While it is fine to assert My 
wife is pregnant in a neutral context, it is odd to claim under those circumstances 
that My wife isn 't pregnant. Giv6n notes that the negative assertion can only be 
appropriate in a context in which the positive proposition is taken to be most likely 
true; only in such a context is the negative statement more informative than its posi­
tive counterpart. For an arbitrary sentence q asserting that a certain event took/takes 
place or that a certain state occurs, the sentence most likely expresses a falsehood if 
used out of context. Thus, by default, negative statements are less informative than 
positive ones , which explains why positive statements are the rule and their negative 
counterparts the exception. Assuming that we choose expressions that make infor­
mative statements ,  Giv6n argues that negative statements can be used appropriately 
only in case this default assumption is overruled, thereby explaining the triggered 
implicature/presupposition of negative statements. 
Where Giv6n seeks to explain the difference in distribution between positive 
and negative statements, we want to explain the difference in distribution between 
positive and negative polar questions . In fact, our explanation is closely connected 
with Giv6n's proposal: we want to argue that in many circumstances, whether a 
positive or negative polar question is asked depends on the informativity of the 
positive and negative statements/answers (see also Han ( 1998» . Some of the exam­
ples discussed in section 2, however, suggest that informativity by itself won't be 
enough: the goal of asking a question is not always Gust) to receive information. 
Therefore, we will propose that the speaker prefers to ask that type of polar question 
for which the utility of the positive answer is higher or equal to that of its negative 
counterpart: 
UV(q) > UV(-,q) 
We will consider two most common cases which can increase the utility of the 
positive answer over the negative one, namely 
1 .  after learning the proposition q it is more likely that one reaches a desirable 
g-world than when its negation is true, i .e . ,  P(g/q) > P(g/-,q) , or 
2. the information value of the proposition q being higher than the information 
value of its negation and thus UV(q) > UV(-,q) if UV(q) = inf(q) = 
log P(q) . 
The first case is most obviously instantiated in polar questions used as pleas or 
requests ; the goal of the questioner coincides with the proposition expressed by the 
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positive answer. The second case is exemplified by questions used as requests for 
information. For negative polar question, we assume that the utility value of the 
negative proposition is higher than that of the positive one, i.e. UV ( -,q) > UV (q) . 
It follows .that bipolar questions are preferred in case both propositions are (equally) 
optimal, and thus UV (q) � UV (-,q) . 
In the following sections we will give a somewhat more detailed analysis of 
the examples discussed in section 2. 
5 . 1 .  Positive Polar Questions 
I UV (q) > UV(-,q) I 
Many examples of (positive) polar questions seem to occur in contexts where the 
speaker has a goal and prefers worlds where she has reached that goal to others. 
On the simplifying assumption that we have one goal - the proposition g, we have 
seen that in these cases UV (q) > UV (-,q) if and only if P(gjq) > l As noted 
above, this is most obvious with questions-invitations, pleas, or with questions of 
the sort Do you know how to repair a punctured tire ? or Can you help me carry 
these boxes ? The goal 9 of asking question ?q is for q to become true: 9 = q. The 
same seems to be going on for invitations. Notice that when 9 = q, the utility of the 
positive answer will by necessity be higher than the utility of the negative answer. 
For pleas and requests it seems natural to assume that the goal equals the 
questioned proposition. However, the two don't have to be identical for our analysis 
to be applicable. With conversation starters, for example, we might think of the goal 
as something like 'having an interesting conversation with someone' .  In this case 
the positive answer is more useful in the sense that it indicates to the conversational 
participants that they have some common interest which might help to induce an 
involved conversation. If the hearer answers No, to a conversation starter like Do 
you like to play golf?, the speaker has to think of another topic (or give up) . 
As we saw above, in some cases utility comes down to informativity: UV (q) > 
UV (-,q) if and only if inf(q) > inf(-,q) . By the definition inf(q) = -logP(q) , this 
means that q is now preferred to -,q in case P(q) < P(-,q) . Given that - as noted 
by Givan - for most natural language statements q it holds that P (q) < P (-,q) , 
it follows from our proposal that a yes/no-question is by default stated in terms of 
a positive polar question. The most obvious examples of positive polar questions 
where this notion of utility seems to be relevant are falling tag questions such as 
(21 ) ,  where the polarity of a tag question contrasts with the polarity of the previous 
sentence uttered by the same speaker. 
(21 )  John isn't such a bad guy, i s  he? 
In this case, the speaker takes the declarative sentence to be most likely true, and 
thus the 'proposition' used by the tag question most likely false, hence, of high 
informativi ty. 
It is commonly assumed in the literature that for a rhetorical question the 
negative answer is presupposed to be true. This by itself, however, cannot explain 
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the rhetorical effect of a question like (22a) . Normally, the point of asking a ques­
tion is to get some (useful) information. For yes-no questions this means that both 
answers must be considered to be possible. If only the negative answer is (com­
monly) presupposed to be true, we get a rhetorical effect. But why do we reach this 
effect with a (positive) polar question (22a) and not with the alternative question 
(22b)? The reason is that the agent wants to highlight/suggest that she recently got 
some indication that the positive proposition might be true after all . 
(22) a. Are you crazy? 
b. Are you crazy or not? 
Questions that check whether some recently received (situational or linguistics) in­
formation is really true like Is David back? or Is it raining ? can also be explained 
in terms of utility as informativity. What these examples have in common is the fol­
lowing: the agent has just received some information (linguistic or otherwise) q that 
was very unexpected (or has an unexpectedly high utility) with respect to her ear­
lier belief-desire state (P, U) . If she should accept the new information, this would 
result in a very different belief-desire state (Pq ,  U) : either P(q) is very low, and 
thus Pq would be very different from P, or the difference between EU(Pq ,  U) and 
EU(P, U) would be unusually large (either positively or negatively) . Therefore, the 
agent double checks by asking questions like in ( 12a) and ( 13a) .  Thus, also in case 
of grounding questions it is utility as informativity that is crucial. However, here it 
is with respect to a belief-desire state before the new information is grounded.3 
Notice that when this last instantiation of utility is at stake, a hearer can con­
clude from the use of the positive polar question that the questioner had a previous 
belief or expectation that the negative proposition is true. These implicatures have 
been analysed recently by Romero & Han (200 1) and they assume - just like we do 
- that the polar questions are asked to check whether a certain revision of a previous 
information state should be made. So far, our analyses are similar.4 However, their 
analysis also makes use of another question triggered by the interrogative sentence. 
They propose that a polar question like WAS John in Hawaii ? isn' t  simply about the 
fact whether or not John was in Hawaii, but also about how strongly the questioner 
should believe that John was in Hawaii. If 'q ' stands for 'John was in Hawaii' ,  they 
propose that WAS John in Hawaii ? doesn't simply give rise to partition {q ,  -,q} , but 
also to {P( q) = 1 ,  P( q) < I } .  This latter partition is called the superquestion (cf. 
Roberts, 1996) generated on the assumption that the questioned proposition gets so­
called verum focus . This superquestion is used to derive the epistemic implicature: 
the answer is still relevant even if the questioner takes q to have a high probability, 
and thus allows for the answerer to derive the corresponding epistemic implicature. 
As we noted already, our analysis of (some instances of) positive polar ques­
tions is based on an intuition similar to the proposal employed by Romero & Han 
(2001)  to explain the epistemic implicatures. The intuition is that the question is 
asked to check whether one should really revise one's previous information state 
with the incoming information. However, we simply derive the epistemic implica­
ture from the way a polar question can be useful. 5 Even with extra assumptions, 
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Romero & Han's explanation still crucially relies on pragmatic (Grice an) reason­
ing. To our minds , the latter is all one really needs to assume for these cases: infor­
mation is more useful/relevant if it would trigger a major revision of the previous 
belief-desire state. 
5 .2 .  Alternative Questions 
In many cases , when an agent asks a question, she has certain goals or desires .  As 
we saw above, this is most obviously the case for pleas or requests : the agent prefers 
certain worlds to others . When asking an alternative question, however, we propose 
that the speaker is simply in search of the answer to whether q or -,q holds . She 
has no bias or wants to give the impression of having no bias with respect to one or 
the other alternative being either more probable or more useful for her conversation 
goals. Thus, alternative questions are not good requests or pleas , e .g. , in Will you 
marry me or not?  the speaker seems to be manifesting his/her indifference towards 
the outcome. 
As noted by Bolinger, alternative questions can be posed with different de­
grees of insistence. 
(23) a. Did you buy it or not? 
b. Did you buy it or didn't you? 
c. Did you buy it or didn' t  you buy it? 
d. Did you or did you not buy it? 
Note that our proposal does not imply that alternative questions are always neutral 
with respect to speaker's desires. We take it that in cases like (23) ,  insistence corre­
sponds to a rise in the utility value (with the relation between UV(q) and UV( -,q) 
remaining constant) . (In fact, the use of the alternative question in general indicates 
that the search for q or -,q has a (relatively) high urgency.) 
Why are alternative questions sometimes impolite as invitations? Politeness 
often works via a series of inferences and background assumptions, so it is noto­
riously difficult to handle theoretically. For that reason, our suggestion is rather 
tentative :  it seems that in the examples in which alternative questions appear to be 
impolite compared to polar questions (as in (24)), this is due to the implicature that 
conventionally comes with alternative questions . In particular, the alternative ques­
tion implies that the utility (and the probability) of the positive answer is equal to 
the negative answer. 
(24) a. Do you want something to drink? 
b. Do you want something to drink or not? 
If the speaker intends to indicate that the hearer's best interests are on her mind (in 
decision-theoretic terms, that the value of the hearer's utility is equal to her own), 
she would choose a question which encodes the hearer's preference. Since with 
ON POLAR QUESTIONS 
invitations, the speaker is presumably offering something that is good or profitable 
to the hearer, e.g. , getting a cup of tea in Can I get you a cup of tea ?,  she would 
choose the positive polar question to encode the fact that UV(q) > UV(-,q) . An 
alternative question would imply that the speaker doesn't care whether the hearer 
gets a cup of tea or not. This appears to be more polite only in situations where the 
speaker does not want to appear pushy or insinuating something about the hearer's 
preferences by implying that UV(q) = UV(-,q) ; it can sometimes be more polite 
to suggest that both the positive and the negative alternative are equally acceptable 
(as in Do you want to come with us or not?) . 
5 .3 .  Negative Polar Questions 
I UV(-,q) > UV(q) I 
Ladd (198 1) distinguishes between inner negation polar questions (INPQs) and 
outer negation polar questions (ONPQs), an idea which actually goes back to Ladu­
saw ( 1979) . Ladusaw explains the difference between what Ladd later called IN­
PQs and ONPQs in terms of the different usage of negation. Used descriptively, it 
negates the proposition contained in the question. Another function of the negation 
(as in Ladd's ONPQs) is not to negate the proposition contained in the question, 
but rather to turn the question into a polite suggestion (since the speaker actually 
believes that the positive proposition is true) . According to Biiring & Gunlogson, 
in languages such as German, an outer negation PQs are marked morphosyntacti­
cally.6 Thus in (25a), the speaker can think it likely that there actually is no vegetar­
ian restaurant in the neighbourhood, in (25b), this cannot be the case. (25b) would 
be uttered, for example, in a situation where the speaker recalls that she has been to 
a vegetarian restaurant in the neighbourhood before. 
(25) a. Gibt es kein vegetarisches Restaurant in dieser Gegend? 
"Is there no vegetarian restaurant in the neighbourhood?"/ 
"Isn't there a vegetarian restaurant in the neighbourhood?" 
b. Gibt es nicht ein vegetarisches Restaurant in dieser Gegend? 
"Isn't there a vegetarian restaurant in the neighbourhood?" 
We would like to argue for a different solution; in particular, we propose that Ladd's 
distinction between inner and outer negation can be discarded. In parallel with pos­
itive polar questions, negative polar questions can be divided into two categories : 
1 .  NPQs where UV (-,q) > UV (q) because the utility function depends solely 
on the goal proposition 9 and P(g / -,q) > P(g / q) , and 
2 .  NPQs where UV( -,q) > UV(q) because the agent only wants to know what 
the world is like and inf(-,q) > inf(q) .  
The appropriateness of quiz examples or internet questions like Do you not sort 
waste ? or Does your bank not support your investment? can be explained in a 
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straightforward way in terms of the first kind of utility function.? For other exam­
ples it is rather informativity that is at issue. Consider first Ladd 's ONPQs: (under 
Biiring & Gunlogson's interpretation) in (25b) the speaker thinks that there is prob­
ably a vegetarian restaurant in the neighborhood. In other words , P( --,q) < P( q) 
and the surprisal value of --'q is higher than of the positive proposition, inf( --,q) > 
inf(q). 8 In the present framework, it is thus not necessary to make any extra as­
sumptions to account for what Ladd calls an ONPQ; the negation used here simply 
negates the proposition contained in the question. 
In a way, it is rather an INPQ like (25a) that is special. We propose that also 
in such an example the informativity of the negated sentence is higher that that of 
its positive counterpart. (From our present perspective, Ladd's original terminology 
is slightly misleading) . We agree with Ladd that (25a) with stress on the negation 
gives rise to a different presupposition/implicature than (25b) . However, this fact 
is not peculiar to negative polar questions, rather, the difference between (25a) and 
(25b) reflects a difference between uses of questions in general . Note that (25a) -
on the reading under discussion - functions very much as a grounding question, or 
a biased question comparable to the example in (26) : 
(26) Is JOHN the boss? 
We often ask this type of questions when we receive some surprising new infor­
mation that we are reluctant to ground without an additional acknowledgement.9 
It is thus informativity that is crucial. However - as discussed in section 5 . 1  - it 
is not informativity with respect to the current belief-desire state, but rather with 
respect to a previous one (or better, the state where the last piece of information is 
not yet grounded). According to Romero & Han (2001) the questioned proposition 
in such a situation typically receives verum focus. For negative polar questions this 
means that the negation must be marked intonationally. Notice, now, that in (25b) 
the negation cannot be stressed, while in (25a) kein can be. This is most likely the 
reason why a question like (25a) in which a non-preposed negation occurs can be 
used to check whether some unexpected information is really true, while a question 
like (26b) with preposed negation cannot. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we showed that positive polar questions, negative polar questions and 
alternative questions differ in the conditions of their use. We gave several examples 
against alternative approaches and on the basis of the discussion we suggested a 
decision-theoretic solution instead. The difference between polar questions and 
alternative questions was explained in terms of the utility values of their answers. 
While for alternative questions, we assumed that the utility value of the positive 
answer is equal to the utility value of the negative answer, for polar questions this 
was generally not the case. In particular, for positive polar questions, UV (q) > 
UV ( --,q) , while for negative polar questions, UV ( --,q) > UV (q) . 
ON POLAR QUESTIONS 
Furthennore, we have identified two basic types of positive/negative polar 
questions, namely those where UV (q) > UV (-,q) because with respect to a goal 
g, P(gjq) > P(gj-,q) , and those where UV(q) > UV(-,q) because inf(-,q) > 
inf(q) . We argued that the distinction between inner negation polar questions and 
outer negation polar questions is superfluous and that the only problematic case 
is that of intonationally marked negation. For these examples (parallels of which 
can be found also in the category of positive polar questions), we followed previous 
proposals in claiming that the stressed word indicates a 'checking' -function of some 
new infonnation and thus that informativity has to be calculated with respect to a 
prior belief-desire state. 
Endnotes 
* The authors would like to thank Maria Aloni, Alastair Butler, Paul Dekker, Darrin 
Hindsill, Katrin Schulz, Henk Zeevat and the audience of the ESSLLI' 02 Workshop 
on Pragmatics in Optimality Theory, the Stuttgart Infonnation Structure workshop 
and the SALT 13  audience for useful discussions and questions . All remaining 
mistakes are our own. 
1 .  We can draw a parallel between polar and alternative questions and if and whether, 
respectively. While ifusually does not introduce alternatives , whether is like other 
wh-words (wh- + either) . 
2. EU(P, U) = Lw P(w) x U(w) = Lw P(w) x ( l ,  if w E g ,  0 else) = LWEg P(w) = 
P(g) . 
3 .  We assume that the same explanation can account for rising tag questions. 
4 .  Disregarding the fact that they consider only informativity, and not utility. 
5 .  Notice that although Romero & Han's (200 1) use of superquestions is motivated 
by Roberts 's ( 1996) use of superquestions in her analysis of question-strategies, 
the relation between a question and a superquestion in the two analyses is of a 
completely different nature. For Roberts , a complete answer to the superquestion 
induced by an interrogative sentence like Who did JOHN invite ?, i .e .  Who invited 
whom ?, is also an answer to the question itself. This, however, can obviously not 
be the case for the superquestion and question induced by an interrogative sentence 
like WAS John in Hawaii ? as used by Romero & Han: the proposition expressed by 
Perhaps not resolves Romero & Han's superquestion, but not the standard yes-no 
question itself. 
6. Actually, they claim that the two types of negative questions are distinguished in 
this way. However, this claim is probably too strong: according to our infonnants, 
with kein unstressed, (25a) below can have both an inner and an outer negation 
reading. 
7. Personal preferences and goals may be distinct. Notice that for these questions 
the questioner doesn' t  necessarily prefer a positive answer. Something similar hap­
pens if the first author asks the second: Does this suit not make me fat ?  
8 .  Romero & Han (2001)  assume that negative polar questions with a so-called 
'preposed' negation such as (26b) give rise to the implicature that the speaker takes 
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the positive proposition more likely to be true. We extend their proposal to all 
NPQs, although we respect Romero & Han's observation that these questions can 
still be used in two different ways . Our analysis is also in accordance with Ladd's 
intuition that tag questions are similar to his ONPQs:  we analyze them both in terms 
of informativity. 
9 .  Although in general, grounding questions can be of both types ,  i .e . , we often ask 
them when the proposition in the question is relevant with respect to achieving our 
goa1. 
References 
[Bolinger 1978] Bolinger, D. ( 1978) 'Yes-no questions are not alternative ques­
tions. In H. Hiz (ed.) ,  Questions, 87- 105 .  D. Reidel. 
[Bfiring & Gunlogson 2000] Buring, D. and C. Gunlogson (2000) , Aren 't positive 
and negative polar questions the same?' semanticsarchive.net 
[Givan 1978] Givan, T. ( 1 978) 'Negation in language: Pragmatics, function, ontol­
ogy. 'In P Cole (ed. )  Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics, 69- 1 1 2. Academic 
Press .  
[Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984] Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof ( 19 84) Studies on 
the Semantics of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers.  PhD thesis, Uni­
versity of Amsterdam. 
[Hamblin 1973] Hamblin, C. ( 1973) 'Questions in Montague English ' ,  Foundation 
of Language, 4 1 -53 .  
[Han 1998] Han, C. ( 1 998) 'Deriving the interpretation of  rhetorical questions ' .  In 
Proceedings of WCCFL 16, 237-253 .  CSLI, Stanford. 
[Jeffrey 1965] Jeffrey, RC. ( 1965) The Logic of Decision. The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
[Ladd 1 9 8 1 ]  Ladd, RD. ( 19 8 1 )  'A first look at the semantics and pragmatics of 
negative questions and tag questions ' .  CLS, 1 7 ,  164- 17 1 .  Chicago Linguistic 
Society. 
[Ladusaw 1979] Ladusaw, W. ( 1979) Polarity Sensitivity as Inherent Scope Rela­
tions. PhD thesis, University of Texas . 
[Merin 1999] Merin, A. ( 1 999) 'Information, relevance and social decision mak­
ing ' .  In J. Ginzburg, L. Moss and M. de Rijke (eds.) Logic, Language and 
Computation, vo1.2. CSLI, Stanford. 
[Roberts 1 996] Roberts , C. ( 1 996) 'Information structure in discourse ' .  In J. Hak 
Yoon and A. Kathol (eds.) Ohio State University Working Papers in Linguistics, 
vo1. 49. 
[Romero & Han 200 1] Romero, M. and C.  Han (2001 )  ' On certain epistemic im­
plicatures in yes/no questions ' .  In R van Rooy and M. Stokhof (eds.) Proceed­
ings of the 13th Amsterdam Colloquium. ILLC, University of Amsterdam. 
[Romero & Han 2002] Romero, M. and C. Han (2002) ' On negative yes/no ques­
tions ' ,  submitted to Linguistics and Philosophy. 
[Shannon 1948] Shannon, C. ( 1 948) 'The mathematical theory of communication' ,  
Bell System Technical Journal, 27, 379-423 and 623-656. 
ON POLAR QUESTIONS 
[van Rooy, to appear (a)] van Rooy, R. (to appear(a)) 'Questioning to resolve deci­
sion problems' ,  Linguistics and Philosophy. 
[van Rooy, to appear (b)] van Rooy, R. (to appear (b)) 'Utility, informativity, and 
protocols ' ,  Journal of Philosophical Logic. 
309 
